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The return of cultural goods to their country of origin has always been a
contentious issue. One needs to look no further than the cases of the Icelandic
manuscripts and of the Parthenon marbles to get an idea of how controversial
such restitutions are. The Icelandic manuscripts, the largest restitution of
cultural goods to day, were returned to Iceland in their entirety in 1997,
eighty years after the initial request. In the case of the Parthenon marbles,
the initial request for their return was made more than a century ago and
the issue has yet to be resolved.1
The issue of restitution of a cultural good is, in essence, a question of
ownership. Who should be the owner of the good, the country of origin
or the host country? Up to now, the debate over ownership of such goods
has been primarily based on legal, historical and moral arguments. Has the
host country acquired the cultural good legally? Do colonial powers have
a moral obligation in returning cultural goods back to their ex-colonies?
Surprisingly, economic considerations seem to be completely absent from this
debate. We are addressing this open question in the debate by examining
which ownership structure would generate the highest overall investments in
cultural goods. Cultural goods are public goods. We take the property
rights approach in determining the optimal ownership structure for public
goods.
Besley and Ghatak (2001) have been among the ﬁrst to examine how
the allocation of ownership aﬀects incentives in the case of public goods.
Their main application is on the experience of NGO involvement in public
good provision in developing countries. They build on Grossman and Hart
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), who developed the property rights theory
for private goods, to analyze government versus private ownership of public
1For more details and for further examples see Greenﬁeld (2007).
1goods. They ﬁnd that the party with the highest valuation for the public good
should be the ownerirrespective of the relative importance of the investments.
So if the NGO is more caring, then it should own the public good even if it
does not have an important investment. This is in stark contrast with the
private goods case where the relative importance of investments is one of the
main factors determining the allocation of ownership.
In this paper we examine the eﬀect of ownership on incentives for the
public good case, but contrary to Besley and Ghatak we are also interested
in reputation eﬀects. Indeed, a dynamic model seems the natural way of
examining ownership of cultural goods, given the longevity of such projects.
To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst dynamic treatment of Besley and Ghatak
(2001).
In a long-term relationship reputation concerns can overcome the hold-up
problem. In a repeated game the optimal ownership structure gives the best
incentives for cooperation by minimizing the gain from deviation relative to
the punishment. We ﬁrst compare ownership by the high valuation agent,
h, and low valuation agent, l, in a setup where only l has an investment.
We ﬁnd that when the investment is elastic, ownership by the noninvesting
high valuation agent is optimal — just as in the static game. This is because
it minimizes the gain from deviation. When h is the owner only part of
l’s investment is sunk in the project if they separate and therefore h cannot
extract from the full value of l’s ﬁrst best investment. h ownership is optimal
although it also minimizes the loss from deviation. Under the optimal
ownership structure of the static game punishment path is very attractive.
Thus, if the country of origin values the cultural good more, then it should
be the owner when the investment is elastic.
When the investment is inelastic the emphasis is on maximizing the pun-
ishment — although this results also in maximal gain from deviation — and
low valuation ownership of the public good is optimal. Therefore due to
technological reasons it can be optimal for the low valuation party (perhaps
2the host country) to own the cultural good.
The results of the static model are quite diﬀerent depending on whether
we are analyzing private or public goods. With private goods the only in-
vesting agent should be the owner while with public goods the high valuation
agent should be the owner — even if he does not have an investment. How-
ever, when we compare our dynamic results with the case of private goods
analyzed by Halonen (2002) the results are surprisingly similar. Dynamic
incentives with both private and public goods are driven by how easy it is
to generate punishment. When investments are elastic, it is easy to gener-
ate punishment and results of the static game hold. While with inelastic
investments the only way to have enough punishment power it to choose the
most unattractive punishment path which is provided by the worst structure
of the static game. This result holds for both private and public goods.
Where the results diﬀer from the private goods case is in relation to joint
ownership. We ﬁrstly have a new result about joint ownership in the static
game. We show that it can be more cost-eﬀective to have two intermediate
investments of joint ownership than one very high and one very low invest-
ment under single ownership. With investment cost function c(y) = yγ this
is the case when γ is high enough. Secondly, in the repeated game joint
ownership of the public good is optimal when it is important to minimize
the gain from deviation. This is the case when investments are elastic and
accordingly γ is low enough. This is why joint ownership arises for a diﬀerent
(but partially overlapping) parameter range in the static and the repeated
game.
We apply our results to cultural goods. We examine in detail the case of
the Icelandic manuscripts which is an example of return to the high valuation
party. We also discuss joint ownership of cultural goods, most notably the
statue of Ur-ningirsu. The head of the statue belongs to the Metropolitan
Museum of Art in New York and its body to the Louvre in Paris. The parts
have been joined since 1974 and the statue rotates between the joint owners
3for exhibition.
Our results suggest a dynamically shifting optimal owner for a cultural
good. When it is very costly to increase the value of cultural good (γ is high)
the host country ownership is optimal. When the necessary expertise has
been developed and the investments become less costly (γ is low) it is opti-
mal to return the cultural good to the country of origin. Return can either
take the form of source country ownership or joint ownership.
Relatively few papers have been exploring directly the model by Besley
and Ghatak (2001). Rasul (2006) applies their model to child custody and
introduces a continuum of ex post custodial schemes and endogenous prob-
ability of marital breakdown. Francesconi and Muthoo (2007) introduce
impurity of public goods and make a case for shared control. They also ﬁnd
that ownership by the low valuation party is optimal if the degree of impurity
is intermediate and the importance of the parties’ investments is similar. In
our paper ownership by the low valuation party can be optimal even with
pure public goods.
The incomplete contracting literature on privatization (e.g. Hart et al.
(1997) and Schmitz (2000)) and on public-private partnerships (e.g. Hart
(2003), Bennett and Iossa (2006) and Martimort and Poyet (2008)) are re-
lated. We diﬀer in allowing also the private providers to be value driven and
modelling explicitly the public good nature of the projects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our
benchmark: the static model of Besley and Ghatak (2001). Section 3 ana-
lyzes the repeated game and compares ownership by high valuation and low
valuation parties. Section 4 focuses on joint ownership and ﬁnds when it can
be optimal in both static and repeated game. Section 5 applies the theory
to the case of cultural goods. Section 6 concludes.
42 Benchmark
Our benchmark is a simpliﬁed version of Besley and Ghatak (2001). There
are two players, l and h. Low valuation agent l makes a project-speciﬁc
investment in human capital, y. In our case of cultural goods we can think
of this as any investment that facilitates the restoration, protection, study
and display of cultural goods. High valuation agent h’s contribution to the
project is a ﬁxed value which we can without loss of generality normalize to
zero. Our results would not change if both agents had an investment but
analysis with one investment is much simpliﬁed.
Public good is produced and the beneﬁt from the project is equal to
y. The players value the project diﬀerently: the low valuation agent’s utility
from the public good is θly and the high valuation agent’s utility is θhy where
θl < θh. Investment costs are given by c(y) = yγ where γ > 1.
Joint surplus is equal to (θl + θh)y − c(y). First best investment is then
given by the following ﬁrst-order condition:
(θl + θh) = c
′ (y
∗) (1)
But contracts are incomplete and typically holdup problem emerges. Ex
ante contracts can only be written on the ownership of the project.
The timing is the following:
• Stage 1. l and h contract on ownership of the project. Either l or h is
the owner.
• Stage 2. l invests in project-speciﬁc human capital.
• Stage 3. l and h bargain over the completion of the project and produce
the public good.
If bargaining breaks down the owner can exclude the non-owner from
taking part in the production of the public good but cannot exclude him
5from consuming the public good. Therefore non-owner’s investment has less
eﬀect on the beneﬁt from the project if bargaining breaks down. The beneﬁt
from the project when bargaining breaks down and h is the owner is  y where
0 ≤   ≤ 1.
Parameter   measures how much of the non-owner’s investment is sunk in
the project. The value of   is high when investment is e.g. about designing
and organizing project implementation and plans and already adopted or
written down. In this situation when the agent leaves, a large part of his
investment is already sunk in the project. The value of   is low if most of
the investment is embedded in the person e.g. charismatic leadership. Then
if the agent leaves, he takes the investment with him.
Also in this situation the players value the project diﬀerently and agent
i’s utility is θi y if bargaining breaks down under h ownership. When l owns
the public good all of his investment contributes to the value of the project
even if bargaining breaks down. Then agent i’s utility is θiy if bargaining
breaks down under l ownership.
When the high valuation agent owns the public good Nash bargaining
leads to the following payoﬀs uh
h and uh
l where superscript denotes the owner
and subscript the agent.
u
h
h = θh y +
1
2




(θl + θh)y +
1
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(θl + θh)y +
1
2
(θl − θh) y − c(y) (3)
Optimal investment, denoted by yh, is then given by:
1
2
(θl + θh) +
1
2





6Agent l receives half of the marginal value of his investment plus half of
the marginal change in default points. Because the agents are producing a
public good, higher investment increases both parties’ default points. (Even
if bargaining breaks down everybody can consume the public good.) Which
increases more depends on the relative valuations. Higher investment by l
increases the high valuation agent’s default point more than his own and
therefore l’s bargaining position is worse. This is why the second term in
(4) is negative. Note that the second term for h (in equation (2)) is positive.
l’s higher investment improves h’s bargaining position.
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When l is the owner, all of his investment contributes to the public good
even if there is disagreement. This is why   does not appear in equation
(6).
It is clear from (4) and (6) that agent l has best incentives when the
negative second term is minimized. Since   ≤ 1 ownership by the high
valuation agent provides the best incentives despite the fact that only the
low valuation agent has an investment. Under h ownership l’s investment
worsens his bargaining position least. The main result of Besley and Ghatak
(2001) is that the more caring agent should own the public good. This
result holds also when both agents have an investment. Our interest is in
examining how the incentives change in a dynamic setup.
73 Repeated game
Now we consider the possibility of cooperation in an inﬁnitely repeated game,
where cooperation is supported through the use of trigger strategies with re-
version to the Nash equilibrium of the static game as punishment.2 In such
an equilibrium, agent l implicitly agrees to make the eﬃcient investment, y∗,
and agent h agrees to pay l a transfer T ∗ which is such that the individual
incentive compatibility constraints are satisﬁed. Cooperation is maintained
as long as both agents follow the eﬃcient behavior. Any deviation from the
eﬃcient behavior is observed in the same period and triggers punishment
for the rest of the game. The crucial issue is to determine which owner-
ship structure gives the lowest critical discount factor above which ﬁrst best
investment is sustainable.
First best will be supported if and only if the discounted payoﬀ stream
from eﬃcient behavior exceeds the payoﬀ stream from deviation for both


























where δ is the discount factor, Pd
i is i’s one-shot deviation payoﬀ and P
p
i is
i’s payoﬀ in the punishment path.
If l deviates in investment, h observes it already in the same period and











2We do not allow for renegotiation of ownership structure in the punishment path. But
Blonski and Spagnolo (2007) show that optimal punishments with renegotiation implement
eﬃcient investment for the same discount factors at which trigger strategies support ﬁrst
best investments without renegotiation of ownership structure (that is, in our case).
8There is no trade-oﬀ from gain today against punishment tomorrow for l.
Therefore to provide h with the best incentives we choose the lowest T ∗ that






















Agent h may default on the promised transfer T ∗ and instead demand a
larger share of the surplus in Nash bargaining. Agent h’s deviation payoﬀ










(θh − θl) y
∗ (12)
This deviation payoﬀ is obtained by using the Nash bargaining formula and
substituting in l’s ﬁrst best investment.








and the loss from deviation by L =




h]. G shows how much more agent h can obtain
by deviating than by cooperation and L denotes how much the surplus in






As usual cooperation is sustainable for high enough discount factor. If the
agents care enough about the future, one-shot gain from deviation is out-
weighed by long term punishment. Gain and loss from deviation depend on
the ownership structure. Our aim is to ﬁnd an ownership structure for which
cooperation is sustainable for the largest range of discount factors. In other
words, the optimal ownership structure minimizes δ.
9We know from the previous section that ownership by the low valuation
agent minimizes the surplus in the static game. Therefore punishment path
is most unattractive and the loss from deviation is maximized. This is the
strength of low valuation ownership in the repeated game. But it turns out
that also the gain from deviation is largest when the low valuation agent
owns the public good. This is proved by Proposition 1. (All the proofs are
in the Appendix.)
Proposition 1 Both the gain and loss from deviation are higher under own-
ership by the low valuation agent than under ownership by the high valuation
agent.
Proposition 1 shows that the gain from deviation is largest when the low













Notice that the second term in (13) is positive. This is because a higher
investment by l increases h’s default payoﬀ more than l’s default payoﬀ and
therefore h’s bargaining position is improved. Clearly h’s deviation payoﬀ
under l ownership (given by (13)) is greater than under h ownership (given
by (12)). When l owns the public good, his ﬁrst best investment contributes
fully to the project even if there is disagreement. Therefore h can extract
from the full value of l’s ﬁrst best investment and his gain is maximal. While
under h ownership only the sunk proportion of the investment improves h’s
bargaining position. This is why gain is maximal under l ownership.
Since both the gain and the loss from deviation are higher under owner-
ship by the low valuation agent, it is not obvious which structure gives the
best incentives for cooperation. Therefore we need to analyze which owner-
ship structure gives the lowest critical discount factor, i.e. minimizes the gain
10relative to the loss. We normalize θl = 1 to simplify the proof of Lemma 1
which helps us in determining the lowest critical discount factor.
Assumption 1. θl = 1 and θh > 1.
Lemma 1 (i) δh = δ
l if   = 1.
(ii)
∂δl
∂  = 0.
(iii)
∂δh
∂  > 0 if and only if γ < 2.
Our main Propositions 2 and 3 follow directly from Lemma 1.
Proposition 2 Ownership by the high valuation agent provides better incen-
tives for cooperation than ownership by the low valuation agent if and only if
γ < 2.
We ﬁnd that for γ < 2 the agents have the best incentives for cooperation
when the gain from deviation is minimal — although at the same time also
the loss from deviation is minimized. In this parameter range ownership by
the high valuation agent is optimal — just like in the static game.
Proposition 3 Ownership by the low valuation agent provides better incen-
tives for cooperation than ownership of the high valuation agent if and only
if γ > 2.
While for γ > 2 maximal loss from deviation will provide the best incen-
tives for cooperation — although at the same time also the gain from deviation
is maximized. Now ownership by the low valuation agent is optimal. In the
static game the low valuation agent should never be the owner but in the
repeated game it can provide the maximal punishment.
11The intuition for our results is the following. The elasticity of investment
to surplus share determines how much the surplus drops along the punish-
ment path. This elasticity is equal to 1/(1 − γ). Therefore the investment
is inelastic (elastic) when γ > 2 (γ < 2). When the investment is inelastic
the surplus does not fall much after deviation under high valuation owner-
ship. Then low valuation ownership is needed to provide enough punishment
power. While for elastic investment, even high valuation ownership provides
large enough punishment, which combined with minimal gain from deviation
results in the best incentives.
These results are in line with Halonen (2002) which analyzes private
goods. In that paper the results of the static game hold for γ < 2 because
the gain from deviation is minimized — just like here. And for γ > 2 the
worst ownership structure of the static game (joint ownership in the private
goods case) is optimal because it provides the maximal punishment. It is
surprising that although there is such a stark diﬀerence in the private goods
and the public goods case in the static game, in the repeated game we obtain
similar results.
But where the public goods case is diﬀerent from the private goods case
is in relation to joint ownership. That is the focus of Section 4.
In this section we have assumed that only l has an investment. Propo-
sitions 1 - 3 would not change if also h had an investment. This is easy to
verify by numerical simulations. One investment case simpliﬁes the proofs
greatly.3
3This is particularly important to take into account as strictly speaking joint ownership
would provide even better incentives than high valuation ownership in the static game
when only l has an investment. When both agents have an investment, this is no longer
true.
124 Joint ownership
In this section we analyze joint ownership both in the static and repeated
game. We focus on the case where   = 1, i.e. all of the non-owners invest-
ment is sunk in the project. In this case h and l ownership are equivalent in
the static game and we can concentrate on comparing joint ownership and
single ownership.
Furthermore, in this section both agents have an investment which is
denoted by yh and yl. It is more natural to examine joint ownership in a
framework where both agents invest. The investments are equally important
and have the same cost function. The agents diﬀer only in how they value
the public good.
4.1 Static game
Under joint ownership both parties’ agreement is needed for the project to
go ahead. Since both parties have blocking power, the disagreement payoﬀs
are zero. For example the cultural good could be stored away in the case
of disagreement under joint ownership, thus preventing both sides from uti-
lizing it because both parties can veto exhibition. In the static game Nash
bargaining leads to the following payoﬀs uJ







(θl + θh)(yh + yl) − c(yi) for i = l,h
The agents split the ex post surplus 50:50 which is why the payoﬀs do
not depend on relative valuations. The incentives are given by:
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2







Since these investments are equal for both agents, we drop the subscript and
denote yJ
i ≡ yJ.
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Just like in Section 3 the second term in (15) is negative. l’s higher investment
increases h’s default payoﬀ by more than his own and puts l in a worse
bargaining position. While for the high valuation agent the second term in
(16) is positive. His higher investment increases his own default payoﬀ more
than l’s default payoﬀ and therefore his bargaining position is improved.
Comparing the incentives under joint ownership and single ownership
we notice that joint ownership removes the second terms in (15) and (16).
Therefore the high valuation agent has lower incentives under joint ownership
and the low valuation agent has better incentives under joint ownership.
Besley and Ghatak (2001) analyze joint ownership in a static game where
investments diﬀer in productivities. They ﬁnd that when the low valuation
agent has got relatively more important investment, joint ownership can be
optimal as incentives are improved for the agent with the more important
investment.
In this paper we analyze a setup where the agents diﬀer only in how they
value the public good. We show that joint ownership of the public good can
be optimal even when the investments are equally important. Proposition 4
gives our new result for the static game.
Proposition 4 (i) Joint ownership is optimal in the static game if   = 1
and γ > 1 +
θh
θl+θh.
(ii) It is optimal to have a single owner in the static game if   = 1 and
γ < 1 +
θl
θl+θh.
Under joint ownership both agents have equal, intermediate incentives.
While with a single owner the high valuation agent has strong incentives and
14the low valuation agent has weak incentives. Now if γ is high enough, it
is more cost-eﬀective to have two intermediate investments than one very
high and one very low. Then joint ownership is optimal. This is proved
in Proposition 4. While for γ low enough highest surplus is obtained when
the high valuation agent has strong incentives even if it means that the low
valuation agent has poor incentives.
4.2 Repeated game
We start analyzing the repeated game by examining the gain and loss
from deviation.4
Proposition 5 (i) Joint ownership minimizes (maximizes) the loss from de-









(ii) Joint ownership minimizes the gain from deviation if   = 1.
Proposition 5 shows that the relative loss from deviation depends on γ.
From Proposition 4 we know that joint ownership is optimal in the static
game for γ > 1 +
θh
θl+θh. Therefore joint ownership minimizes the loss from
deviation in this parameter range. While for γ < 1 +
θl
θl+θh joint ownership
is the worst structure in the static game and therefore provides the maximal
punishment in the repeated game.
Proposition 5 also shows that joint ownership minimizes the gain from
deviation for   = 1. Under joint ownership the agents can extract from only
half of the value of the other agent’s ﬁrst best investment. While under single
ownership they can extract from the full value since even the non-owner’s
investment is fully sunk in the project. This is why under joint ownership
the gain is minimal.
4The sharing rule when both agents invest is presented in the Appendix.
15Proposition 5 shows that for γ < 1 +
θl
θl+θh and   = 1 joint ownership
provides both the maximal punishment and the minimal gain from devia-
tion. Then there is no trade-oﬀ but joint ownership unambiguously provides
the best incentives for cooperation. While for γ > 1 +
θh
θl+θh there is a fa-
miliar trade-oﬀ: joint ownership minimizes the gain but also minimizes the
punishment. Further examination is therefore needed to determine which
ownership structure gives the lowest gain relative to the loss. Lemma 2 com-
pares the critical discount factors for diﬀerent ownership structures.
Lemma 2 (i) δ
J = δ




1/∂θh > 0 if and only if γ < 2.
Proposition 6 follows from Lemma 2.
Proposition 6 (i) Joint ownership is optimal if   = 1 and γ < 2.
(ii) It is optimal to have a single owner if   = 1 and γ > 2.
Proposition 6 shows that the results again depend on whether γ is smaller
or greater than 2. But now also the results of the static game depend on γ
and that gives a new twist.
For γ > 2 the emphasis is on maximizing punishment — as in Section 3 —
and the worst structure of the static game guarantees it. In this parameter
range single ownership provides the largest punishment because for large γ it
is not cost-eﬃcient that the high valuation agent has a very large investment
and the low valuation agent has a very low investment.
For γ < 2 minimizing the gain from deviation provides the best incentives
for cooperation. But now joint ownership minimizes the gain from deviation
always, whether it is optimal or not in the static game. This is where the
results diﬀer from Section 3: minimal gain is no longer equivalent to optimal
structure of the static game. The results diﬀer because when we introduce
joint ownership, also the results of the static game depend on γ.
16It is interesting to compare when joint ownership emerges in the static
and in the repeated game. In the static game joint ownership is optimal for
large γ while in the repeated game joint ownership arises for small γ. This
demonstrates that joint ownership can be optimal in both static and repeated
game but it can emerge for diﬀerent parameter values. But the parameter
range is partially overlapping: for 1 +
θh
θl+θh < γ < 2 joint ownership is
optimal in both static and repeated game.
In the repeated game joint ownership is optimal when it is important to
minimize the gain from deviation. In the static game joint ownership is
optimal when it is more cost-eﬀective to have two intermediate investments
rather than one low and one high investment. Minimizing the gain from
deviation is important when the investments are elastic (γ < 2) while inter-
mediate investments are more cost-eﬀective when the cost function is very
steep
￿




. Joint ownership therefore behaves quite diﬀerently in
static and repeated settings.
We can also compare Proposition 6 to the case of private goods. We note
that the result is exactly the opposite. With private goods joint ownership
is optimal for γ > 2 and single ownership for γ < 2 (Halonen (2002)). This
is naturally because joint ownership is never optimal in the static game with
private goods.
Finally, we discuss how relaxing the assumption   = 1 would aﬀect our
results. Figure 1 summarizes our ﬁndings.
17Figure 1
The incentives under joint ownership do not depend on  . When we lower
  from 1 δl and δh diverge. For γ > 2 it is important to maximize punishment
and ownership by the low valuation agent provides the most unattractive
punishment path. Therefore ownership of the low valuation agent would be
optimal for γ > 2 and   < 1.
While for γ < 2 the emphasis is on minimizing the gain. Proposition
185 shows that joint ownership minimizes the gain for   = 1 but it turns out
that this result does not hold for all values of  . From Proposition 1 we
know that the gain under h ownership is always lower than the gain under
l ownership. Therefore we are comparing joint ownership and h ownership
to ﬁnd minimal gain. The gain under h ownership is increasing in   and
it is maximal for   = 1; when all of the non-owner’s ﬁrst best investment is
sunk in the project, the owner can extract from the full value of the ﬁrst best
investment. Then joint ownership provides the minimal gain. While for low
values of   the gain under h ownership is lower than the gain under joint
ownership (which does not depend on  ). This is why joint ownership is
optimal for γ < 2 and   large enough while ownership by the high valuation
agent is optimal for γ < 2 and   low.
5 Cultural goods
Ownership of cultural goods is a ﬁercely debated topic where emotions run
high. Source countries, armed with historical and/or moral reasons have
requested the return of cultural property. On the other hand, host countries
have in many cases rejected such requests based on legal and/or historical
grounds. For example, in the case of the Icelandic manuscripts, Iceland’s
request for their return was primarily based on historical and moral grounds.
The manuscripts were seen as a central part of Icelandic cultural tradition
and their return as an issue of utmost importance. In the words of a leading
modern Icelandic historian, "next to the issues of ﬁshing boundaries around
and the defence of Iceland itself, the return of the manuscripts [was] the
biggest and most serious problem in the foreign relations of independent
Iceland." (Nielsen (2002), p.5) Furthermore, Iceland claimed that Denmark
had a moral obligation to return the manuscripts, especially after the ending
of the monarchical union with Denmark in December 1944. Opponents of
return argued that the manuscripts constituted a pan-Scandinavian heritage
19and that Iceland had no legal claim to them. They also claimed that Iceland
lacked both technical resources to conserve the manuscripts and scholarly
resources to study and publish them while Copenhagen was a recognized
centre for Old Norse studies. (Greenﬁeld (2007))
Similar arguments have also been presented in the most famous amongst
the cultural restitution claims, the case of the Parthenon marbles located in
the British Museum. The main argument of the proponents of return has
been that the marbles are an important part of Greek cultural heritage that
were removed by Lord Elgin at a time when Greece was under Ottoman
control and under dubious circumstances. The British Museum’s response
to the restitution calls has been that the Parthenon marbles had been legally
acquired by Lord Elgin and furthermore, the museum’s trustees do not have
the right to dispose of any objects.
Such lines of arguments are by no means unique in the cultural restitution
literature. Modelling cultural goods as public goods and following a property
rights approach provides a new perspective to the restitution question. It
enables us to abstract from legal, historical and moral considerations and
concentrate on what is best for the cultural good itself, i.e. allocate ownership
in such a way so that investments in restoration, protection, study and display
of the cultural good are maximized.
5.1 Cultural goods and property rights theory
Our framework applies well to cultural property and restitution. UNESCO
deﬁnes cultural property as "historical and ethnographical objects and doc-
uments including manuscripts, works of the plastic and decorative arts, pa-
leontological and archaeological objects and zoological, botanical and min-
eralogical specimens" (UNESCO (2001), p.9). In essence, cultural goods are
public goods.
Furthermore, the investments are to a large extent project-speciﬁc and in
human capital. A good example are the Dunhuang manuscripts. In 1900, a
20total of 40,000 documents were discovered in a cave near Dunhuang, China.
Roughly a quarter were taken to each of Beijing, London, Paris and St.
Petersburg. Although the manuscripts were discovered more than a century
ago, conservation and cataloguing has been very limited. Apart from the
size of the undertaking, the limited number of individuals with the necessary
expertise to deal with such a unique ﬁnd has been chieﬂy responsible for the
slow progress. (Whitﬁeld (2001))
Another example was raised in an interview of archeologist Nicoletta
Momigliano. Excavations are often dated by the type of pottery found. An
archeologist specialized in the pottery sequence in Knossos will ﬁnd this
knowledge of very limited value in closeby South Western Turkey. In other
words, this is project-speciﬁc human capital.
5.2 Return of cultural good to the high valuation party
The value that diﬀerent agents place on the cultural good is an important
determinant of the optimal ownership structure in our model. This is consis-
tent with the reasoning of UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Committee for the
Return of Cultural Property, the main body dealing with restitution claims
from source countries. It takes an active role in resolving restitution claims
by mediating between the source and host countries. The committee’s role is
to evaluate the claim and recommend return if the cultural good is "highly
charged with cultural (or natural) signiﬁcance ... the removal of [such an] ob-
ject from its original cultural context irrevocably divests that culture of one
of its dimension".5 We can safely interpret this condition as meaning that
recommendation for return will only be granted for goods highly valued by
the source country. The recommendation has been made on moral grounds.
Property rights theory can show that ownership by the high valuation party
can also generate the highest investments in the cultural good.
5Greenﬁeld (2007), p. 365.
21Greenﬁeld (2007), a leading authority, uses a similar argument when call-
ing for the return of cultural goods to their country of origin. According to
her "... cultural property is most important to the people who created it or
for whom it was created or whose particular identity and history it is bound
with. This cannot be compared with the scholastic or even inspirational
inﬂuence on those who merely acquire such objects or materials".6 Green-
ﬁeld argues for return of (i) historic records or manuscripts of a nation, (ii)
objects torn from immovable property and (iii) paleontological materials.
A good example of return of cultural good to a high valuation party is the
Icelandic manuscripts. Made of vellum or paper, these documents held the
medieval saga literature of Iceland, and were ﬁrst collected for the most part
by Icelander Árni Magnússon in the early 18th century. A professor at the
University of Copenhagen (then the only university serving Iceland, being
part of the Danish kingdom), Magnússon was sent to Iceland to compile a
register of its farms and estates. Being a keen antiquarian, he used his spare
time in this period to search the country for manuscripts, and on his return
to Copenhagen brought back ﬁfty-ﬁve crates full. Over his remaining life he
continued to add to this collection, and though two thirds were destroyed by
ﬁre in 1728, the collection was still large on being left to the university after
his death in 1730.
Beginning in the 19th century, requests were made for the manuscripts’
return to Iceland, and on the country’s independence in 1944 the campaign
became an uppermost priority. Finally in 1971, after much wrangling, a Dan-
ish law was ratiﬁed which required that all manuscripts held to be ‘Icelandic
cultural property’ would be returned to Iceland. These were generally de-
ﬁned as works composed or translated by an Icelander, whose content was
wholly or chieﬂy concerned with Iceland. A committee of two Danish and
two Icelandic scholars decided which manuscripts satisﬁed these conditions.
Iceland was clearly the country which valued the manuscripts most. De-
6Greenﬁeld (2007), p. 411.
22sire for their return had been a running theme throughout Iceland’s path to
independence, and when the ﬁrst manuscripts ﬁnally arrived in the country
it was a national event. "Shops and schools were closed. The whole nation
... was listening to the radio or watching television for a live account of the
historic event which was taking place." (Greenﬁeld (2007), p. 1)
There are many other examples of repatriation: the 1930s return from
Britain to Sri Lanka of the shrine, scepter and orb of the last king of Kandy;
the 1964 return from Britain to Burma of the Mandalay Regalia; the 1982
return from Italy to Ethiopia of the throne of Emperor Menelek II; the 2007
return of the Venus de Cyrène from Italy to Libya. Even fragments of the
Parthenon were returned to Greece in 2008 from an individual in Sweden,
from the Salinas Museum in Palermo and from the Vatican Museum. Repa-
triation of cultural property continues to occur, and is increasingly accepted
by western nations as being, in many cases, the correct course of action.
5.3 Joint ownership
There are some examples of joint ownership of cultural goods. The prime
example is the statue of Ur-ningirsu. Until 1974 the 22nd century BC statue
of a Mesopotamian ruler was in two parts: its head resided in and belonged
to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, and its body resided in and
belonged to the Louvre in Paris. After 20 years of discussion an agreement
was reached whereby each party would retain ownership of its respective
part, but the statue would be exhibited in its entirety, alternating between
the two museums every three years. This arrangement, since then altered to
allow longer stays at each museum and out of schedule transfers for special
occasions, has continued to the present day. (Greenﬁeld (2007), p. 401)
Another arrangement resembling joint ownership may be found with the
bronze statue ‘Saint Christopher Carrying the Christ Child with the Globe
of the World’. The statue of the saint holding in his outstretched hand the
baby Christ, who in turn holds the world, was until 1970 in two parts. Saint
23Christopher was held by the Louvre, and thought to be Hercules or Atlas,
and the Christ Child was held by Washington D.C.’s National Gallery of
Art, thought just to be a ‘Boy with a Ball’. That year their true roles were
discovered, and from 1973 it was agreed that they be exhibited together at
the Louvre, with the Christ Child on permanent loan from Washington. In
exchange, the Louvre made permanent loan of a diﬀerent bronze to Wash-
ington. (Greenﬁeld (2007), p. 401)
A further example of joint ownership is the proposed joint acquisition
of two Titian paintings, Diana and Actaeon, and Diana and Callisto, by the
National Gallery and the National Galleries of Scotland. Both paintings were
secured by the Duke of Bridgewater in 1798 and have been on long-term loan
to the National Galleries of Scotland since 1945. If successful, the two Titians
will be displayed in London and Edinburgh, alternating between the galleries
every ﬁve years.7
5.4 Changing optimal owner
Our results suggest that ownership by the high valuation party is not always
optimal. On the contrary, under certain conditions the low valuation, host
country, should own the cultural good. More speciﬁcally, this is the case
when it is very costly to increase the value of the cultural good (γ > 2) as
then it is important to maximize the punishment. This is likely to hold at a
time when relevant expertise is limited and for more unique ﬁnds. The case
of the Dunhuang manuscripts illustrates this point. Due to the uniqueness of
these manuscripts and the lack of suﬃcient numbers of individuals with the
necessary expertise, any increase in the value is achieved at a considerable
cost. (Whitﬁeld (2001))
Investments are likely to become less costly later in the life of the project
after the necessary expertise has been developed. This suggests that, al-
though host ownership is initially optimal, as investments become less costly
7http://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/campaign-titians.htm
24(γ < 2), return becomes optimal as then it is most important to minimize
the gain from deviation. Return can be either full (source country owner-
ship) or partial (joint ownership). In our model return of cultural good to
the source country is optimal when not much of the host country’s invest-
ment is sunk in the project (low   and γ < 2). This is consistent with the
case of Icelandic manuscripts where the Arnamagnean Institute in University
of Copenhagen still holds much expertise, which is witnessed by continuing
active cooperation with the Arnagarður Institute in Reykjavik (e.g. by ex-
changing members of staﬀ and summer schools). While when investments
are largely sunk in the project (high   and γ < 2) joint ownership is optimal.
For a statue of Ur-ningirsu investments (largely in protection) are mainly
sunk.
5.5 Rescuing cultural property?
One of the arguments in the current debate has been that many of the objects
were removed in the past for safe keeping. In eﬀect this is an argument about
changing relative valuations. In the past host country was the high valuation
party while now the roles are reversed, which triggers the requests for return.
We give an alternative explanation to changes in ownership which is
rooted in a technological change. When expertise has been developed, it
becomes optimal to shift ownership from the low valuation host country to
the country of origin.
There are instances where a rescue argument is valid, most notably during
the Cultural Revolution in China in the late 1960s when cultural destruction
was intentional. Other upheavals and wars have destroyed cultural treasures.
Some cultural treasures would no longer exist if they had not been removed.
China’s largest encyclopaedia has both suﬀered from upheavals and been
rescued. The encyclopaedia was commissioned by the Ming Dynasty emperor
Yung Lo and ﬁnished in 1407. Over 2000 scholars worked more than four
years to complete 22,937 volumes. Two copies were made in addition to the
25original in 1567. But only one copy survived the fall of the Ming Dynasty:
the original and one copy were destroyed. Then during the Boxer Rebellion
in 1900 ﬁre was set to the building where the only remaining copy was kept.
But it turned out that a number of the volumes had been removed to Russia
and the United Kingdom and were thus rescued.8
The destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan in Afghanistan by the Tal-
iban in 2001 illustrates a further instance where a rescue argument would
have been valid. The two seventh-century Buddhas, one nearly 175 feet tall
and the other 120 feet, were destroyed by the Taliban with the excuse that
"these idols have been [the] gods of the inﬁdels", despite the oﬀers by various
international organisations to rescue the statues.9
But rescue argument has also been used as an excuse. Most blatantly
by André Malraux when he claimed he was on a mission of rescue when
he removed carvings embedded in the walls of the temple of Bantea-Srei of
the Angkor complex in Cambodia in 1923. He said his aim was to put into
circulation what has been ’lost’ in the ’abandoned’ temple in the jungle. His
group was arrested in Phnom Penh on a ship carrying the carvings. The
carvings were restored to the temple. Malraux was sentenced to three years
imprisonment, an appeal reduced it to suspended sentence of one year and 8
months — and in the 1960s Malraux became the French Minister of Cultural
Aﬀairs.10
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the eﬀect of reputation on ownership of public goods.
We show that in the dynamic setup the optimal ownership of a public good
depends not only on the parties’ relative valuations for the good but also on
8Greenﬁeld (2007), p. 404.
9The New York Times, March 4th, 2001. For further information see also The New
York Times, March 3rd and 19th, 2001
10Greenﬁeld (2007), p. 392-395.
26technology (elasticity of investment).
In the static game optimal ownership depends importantly on whether
we are analysing private or public goods. The ownership of private goods
is largely determined by technology (e.g. importance of investment) while
relative valuations drive the results with public goods. This is because with
private goods higher investment increases only agent’s own default payoﬀ.
Ownership guarantees high default payoﬀ and good incentives for the agent
with important investment. With public goods everyone’s default payoﬀ
is increased by higher investment and the agent with high valuation gains
most and obtains stronger bargaining position while low valuation agent’s
bargaining position is weaker. Ownership by high valuation agent both
maximizes the positive eﬀect on himself and minimizes the negative eﬀect on
the low valuation agent.
In the repeated game the results are surprisingly similar to the private
goods case. This is because dynamic incentives with both private and public
goods are driven by how easy it is to generate punishment. With inelastic
investments the only way to have enough punishment power is to choose the
most unattractive punishment path. Ownership structure that performs
worst in the static game guarantees largest punishment. In the public good
case it is ownership by the low valuation agent. While when investments are
elastic we can concentrate on minimizing the gain from deviation, which in
both cases is obtained by the optimal ownership stucture of the static game:
ownership by the high valuation agent for public goods.
We also ﬁnd that the joint ownership of public good can emerge in both
static and repeated setup but for a diﬀerent parameter range. In the static
setup the beneﬁt of joint ownership is that incentives are equalized which is
particularly important when γ is high. In the repeated setup the beneﬁt
of joint ownership is that the gain from deviation is minimized11 which is
paramount when γ is low.
11When µ is high enough.
27Our key ﬁndings are applied to return of cultural goods to the country
of origin. Property rights theory shows that both moral and economic
arguments can go hand in hand: ownership by the high valuation party
can also generate the highest investments in the cultural good. But in the
dynamic context also ownership by the low valuation party can provide the
best incentives. Ownership by the low valuation host country is optimal
when relevant expertise is limited and return of the cultural good becomes
optimal when the necessary expertise is developed.
Valuation for the public good is a key driving force in our analysis. We
follow Besley and Ghatak (2001) in assuming that the parties’ valuations
are common knowledge. Optimal ownership with asymmetric information
about the valuations remains as an open question.
287 Appendix
Firstly we give the explicit forms of the investments. For the one invest-













































Proof of Proposition 1.
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For   = 1 yh = yl (see equations (4) and (6)) and therefore Gh = Gl.
Now lower   from 1. Note that ∂y∗/∂  = 0. We ﬁrst diﬀerentiate Gh with















(θl + θh) +
1
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∂Gh/∂  > 0 since by deﬁnition θl < θh and yh < y∗ due to holdup problem.




Since Gh = Gl for   = 1, equations (19) and (20) prove that Gh < Gl for
  < 1.
It is obvious that the loss from deviation is higher under l ownership as
in the static game h ownership is optimal. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1.
(i) For   = 1 yh = yl (see equations (4) and (6)) and therefore Gh = Gl,
Lh = Ll and δ
h = δ
l.
(ii) In the proof of Proposition 1 we showed that ∂Gl/∂  = 0 (equation
(20)). Furthermore, it is obvious that also Ll is also independent of   since
∂yl/∂  = 0 and ∂y∗/∂  = 0. Therefore ∂δ





Gh + Lh. (21)
Substituting (17) and
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2γ , ψ =
(θl+θh)+ (θh−θl)





γ−1 and yh = ν
1




















Next we diﬀerentiate δ
h with respect to  . Note that ∂ν/∂  =
(θl−θh)
2γ ,
∂ψ/∂  = −
(θl−θh)










































































After manipulations (detailed steps in the Supplementary Appendix) we ﬁnd






2ν (γ − 1)
[f (η) − f (ν)] (24)










. Since (θl − θh) < 0,
∂δh
∂  > 0 if
and only if f (η) < f (ν).
Unfortunately f (x) is not monotonic. We will now examine the proper-



































































2(γ−1) < 1 (26)







⇔ (2 − γ)lnν < (2 − γ)lnη (27)
Since η > ν equation (27) holds and f′(ν) > 0 if and only if γ < 2.
Similarly we can prove that f′ (η) > 0 if and only if γ > 2.










2(γ−1) > 0 if and only if γ > 2
Accordingly, we have shown that for γ > 2 f (x) is decreasing at x = ν,
increasing at x = η and convex. While for γ < 2 f (x) is increasing at x = ν,
decreasing at x = η and concave. Figure 2 illustrates f (x).
33Figure 2a: γ < 2
Figure 2b: γ > 2























if and only if γ > 2
(28)
As Figure 2 illustrates, it is most diﬃcult to satisfy f (η) > f (ν) for
  = 1 when γ > 2, since ν is decreasing in   (and η does not depend on  ).
If f (η) > f (ν) for   = 1, it holds for all 0 ≤   ≤ 1. Similarly it is most
diﬃcult to satisfy f (η) < f (ν) for   = 1 when γ < 2. Now let us assume
that   = 1 and thus ν = θl/γ.
Substitute ν = θl/γ and η = (θl + θh)/γ in (28) and also take into








































− (1 + θh)
2−γ












⇔ (1 + θh)
γ








2(γ−1). This gives γ = 2α
2α−1. Note that limγ→1α = ∞ and
limγ→∞α = 1
2. Therefore the relevant range for us is α > 1
2. We have to
prove that
35(1 + θh)
α − (1 + θh)
1−α − (2α − 1)θh < 0 if and only if
1
2
< α < 1 (30)
This implies that
∂δh
∂  < 0 if and only if 1
2 < α < 1 , or if and only if γ > 2.
Deﬁne x = 1 + θh > 2. Substitute in (30).
x
α − x
1−α < (2α − 1)(x − 1) (31)
Denote y (α) = xα and z (α) = x1−α.
y
′ (α) = y (α)lnx > 0
z
′(α) = −z (α)lnx < 0
Therefore the left-hand side of (31) is increasing in α since y′ (α)−z′ (α) > 0.
Let us examine further the properties of the left-hand side of (31).
y
′′ (α) = y (α)(lnx)
2 > 0
z
′′ (α) = z (α)(lnx)
2 > 0
y
′′ (α) − z
′′ (α) = (lnx)
2 [y (α) − z (α)] > 0 if and only if α > 1/2
Accordingly the left-hand side of (31) is increasing in α, is concave up to
α = 1/2 and then convex. We will further evaluate it for some values for α.












36y(1) − z (1) = x − 1 > 0
Then we will examine the right-hand side of (31). Denote g(α) = (2α − 1)(x − 1).
We have g′ (α) = 2(x − 1) > 0 and g′′ (α) = 0. Furthermore,







g (1) = x − 1 > 0







We have established that both the left-hand side and the right-hand side
of (31) are increasing in α. Since the right-hand side is linear and the left-
hand side is concave between 0 and 1
2 and convex after 1
2 and the right-hand





, it has to be true that (31)
holds if and only if 1
2 ≤ α ≤ 1. (See Figure 3).
37Figure 3
Since the relevant range for us is α > 1
2 this proves equation (30) and
shows that
∂δh
∂  < 0 if and only if γ > 2.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
It is clear from Lemma 1 that δh < δ
l if and only if γ < 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.
It is clear from Lemma 1 that δh > δ
l if and only if γ > 2. Q.E.D.
Sharing rule when both agents invest





























The agents can always ﬁnd a suitable T ∗ that satisﬁes both agents’ incen-
tive compatibility constraints as long as the aggregate incentive compatibility




























− (θl + θh)(y∗ + y∗) + 2c(y∗)
￿
and









Proof of Proposition 4.
Joint surplus under single ownership is larger than under joint ownership



































































2γ , B =
θh
γ and C =
θl
γ . Note that C < A < B and A is the





























γ−1. Equation (37) is equivalent to
[F (A) − F (C)] < [F (B) − F (A)] (38)
First show that F ′ (x) > 0 for x ≤ B.
F















The maximum x for which we are analyzing F (x) is B =
θh
γ . Clearly (39)
is satisﬁed in the relevant range and we have that F (B) > F (A) > F (C).
Note furthermore that B − A = A − C since A is the average of C and B.



















Evaluate (40) for x = A.
θl + θh
2γ
< (2 − γ)
(θl + θh)
γ
⇔ γ < 1
1
2
Similarly evaluating (40) for x = B and x = C we ﬁnd that F (x) is convex
at x = B if and only if γ < 1 +
θl
θl+θh and F (x) is convex at x = C if and
only if γ < 1 +
θh
θl+θh.
Therefore F (x) is convex for x ∈ [C,B] if γ < 1 +
θl
θl+θh while F (x) is
concave for x ∈ [C,B] if γ > 1 +
θh
θl+θh.
We are evaluating whether F (x) increases more when x increases from
C to A than when x increases from A to B where A is the average of C
and B. We have proved that F (x) is increasing. Furthermore F (x) is
convex in the relevant range if γ < 1 +
θl
θl+θh. For convex F (x) we have
that F (A) − F (C) < F (B) − F (A). This is when single ownership is
optimal. While when F (x) is concave in the relevant range, i.e. γ > 1+
θh
θl+θh,
F (A) − F (C) > F (B) − F (A) and joint ownership dominates.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.
(i) Proposition 4 shows that joint ownership is optimal in the static game
for   = 1 and γ > 1 +
θh
θl+θh. Therefore joint ownership minimizes the loss
from deviation in this parameter range. For   = 1 and γ < 1+
θl
θl+θh single
ownership dominates joint ownership in the static game. Therefore joint
ownership maximizes the loss from deviation in this parameter range.
















































































− [(θl + θh)y
∗ − 2c(y
∗)] (41)




































The ownership structures are equivalent for θh = θl because the second
terms cancel out in (15) and (16). Diﬀerentiate G1 and GJ with respect to
θh. Note that ∂y1















































































which is satisﬁed (see equations (14) and (16)).
We know that for θl = θh GJ = G1. Now increase θh from θh = θl.
Equations (43) and (44) show that the change in G1 is greater than the




for θh > θl and   = 1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2.
(i) The ownership structures are equivalent if θl = θh because the second
terms in the incentives under single ownership (equations (15) and (16))
cancel out.
(ii) Equation (42) gives the gain from deviation under joint ownership.


















































































































































(γ − 1) − (γ − 2)
￿































































































































































































After manipulations (detailed steps can be found in the Supplementary




s = (1 + θh)
γ





This is equivalent to equation (29) in the proof of Lemma 1. Therefore
∂δ
1/∂θh < 0 if and only if γ > 2.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6.
It is clear from Lemma 2 that δJ < δ
1 if and only if γ < 2. Q.E.D.
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